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TESTING THE LIMITS OF PROCEDURAL RULEMAKING: HOW THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT CAN USE TAFAS V. DUDAS TO CLARIFY THE
AUTHORITY OF THE PATENT OFFICE
Michael Neuerburg'
In an effort to reduce the backlog of unexamined patent
applications, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
created a controversial new set of rules for patent applicants. In
Tafas v. Dudas, a Federal District Court judge issued a permanent
injunction against the rules, finding their enactment to be outside
the Patent Office's authority. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to define better both
the rulemaking authority of the Patent Office and the Circuit's
approach to the distinction between substantive and procedural
rules. This Recent Development proposes a more flexible
approach toward classifying a rule as substantive or procedural
than that used by the District Court in Tafas and discusses how
this approach would affect the analysis of the Patent Office's
rulemaking authority.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attempting to speed up the patent examination process, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") created a set
of rules called the "Changes to Practice for Continued Examination
Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct
Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications," or
more simply, the "Final Rules." 2 These rules were to be enacted
on November 1, 2007, and would have placed additional and
unprecedented obligations or limitations on many patent
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
2 Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications ("Final Rules"), 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716-46,843 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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applicants. However, in the case of Tafas v. Dudas,4 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued a
preliminary injunction against enactment of the Final Rules the day
before they were to be enacted, followed by a decision and
permanent injunction on April 1, 2008.' The court held that the
Final Rules were substantive and thus outside the PTO's authority,
citing cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") which hold that the PTO does
not have substantive rulemaking power.' The PTO has appealed,
and Tafas v. Dudas is pending before the Federal Circuit.
The stated goal of the Final Rules is to reduce the backlog at
the Patent Office by creating a more "focused and effective
examination process" for patent applications.7  One important
factor affecting the complexity of a patent application, and thus the
time required to examine it, is the number of claims in the
application.! Applications with twenty-five or more claims
3 Id. at 46,836. Rule 75 requires an Examination Support Document for
applications containing more than five independent claims or twenty-five total
claims. Id. at 46,836. Rule 78 requires a petition and showing when filing a
third or subsequent continuation application. Id. at 46,837. Rule 114 requires a
petition and showing when filing a second or subsequent RCE. Id. at 46,841;
see infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text for an explanation of some terms of
art used in Patent Law.
4 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008).
5 Id. at 808 n.2.
6 Id. at 811; see infra Part II(A).
7 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,717 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
8 ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 19-21(2nd
ed. 2004). The claims in a patent define exactly what the invention is. Other
products only infringe upon the patent if they contain each and every element of
one or more of the patent claims. Claims typically contain technical language
and are very precisely worded to have the proper legal effect. The process of
obtaining a patent is known as patent prosecution. A central goal of patent
prosecution is to find the best possible set of claims allowed by the examiner.
Patents usually contain many claims describing the same invention so that
similar products which would not infringe one claim because of a minor
variation will be covered by another claim. Another reason for multiple
overlapping claims is to protect the invention, even if some claims are later held
to be invalid. There are two general types of claims: independent and
dependent. Independent claims do not refer to other claims, while dependent
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average an examination period that is four to six months longer
than the examination period for applications with five or fewer
total claims.' According to the PTO, applications with more than
twenty-five claims also have a significantly higher error rate than
applications with fewer than twenty-five claims.o Final Rule 75
(the "5/25 rule") would require any application with more than five
independent claims or more than twenty-five total claims to
include extra documentation (called an examination support
document, or "ESD") with claim explanation and prior art search
information." The PTO argues that because applications with
many claims are comparatively time-consuming and difficult to
examine, it is fair and efficient to require such applications to
include extra documentation designed to streamline the
examination process.12  The court rejected the 5/25 rule as
substantive because the rule would create a significant new
obligation for patent applicants, since applicants had previously
never been required to perform a prior art search."
claims incorporate all the elements of another claim and then add additional
elements. Dependent claims typically take less effort to examine because the
examiner will have already considered the elements incorporated by reference
and need only consider the new elements. Id.
9 Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O Blog, http://www.patentlyo.com
/patenti2008/09/evidence-base-l.html (Sept. 14, 2008) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'o Brief for the Appellants at 9, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. July
18, 2008) (citing JAl81 (AR 05059) (FY05/FYO6 data)).
" Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,843 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1). See infra Part III(A)).
12 Brief for the Appellants, supra note 10, at 10.
" Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Appellees at 20-22, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct.
3, 2008). Although there is no obligation on the applicant to perform a prior art
search, many applicants perform at least a basic prior art search anyway. Id.
However, because an ESD would become part of the patent application history,
it could form an additional basis for challenges to the patent's validity by
defendants in infringement actions. Id. The American Intellectual Property
Law Association ("AIPLA") argues that, to minimize this risk to the eventual
patent, preparing an ESD would require more time and effort by counsel than
would performing a simple prior art search. Id. For this reason, AIPLA
believes that the cost of an ESD would be closer to the cost of a
FALL 2008] 205
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Another important factor contributing to application
examination time is the use of continuation applications and
Requests for Continued Examination ("RCEs"). Both continuation
applications and RCEs are methods by which an applicant may pay
the Patent Office to extend the examination of an application
family.' 4 There is no limit on how many continuation applications
or RCEs an applicant may file.'" Final Rules 78 and 114
(collectively the "2+1 rule") would require any applicant who
wished to file more than two continuation applications or one RCE
that the continuation application or RCE contained material that
could not have been presented previously.'" The PTO justifies
Rules 78 and 114 as discouraging unnecessary continuation
applications and RCEs, thereby encouraging efficiency by
applicants and reducing the backlog of unexamined patents." The
District Court, on the other hand, considered the rules to infringe
upon a patent applicant's right to an unlimited number of
continuation applications and RCEs.'"
validity/invalidity opinion ($15,241 average cost) than to a novelty search
($2,000 typical cost). Id.
14 DURHAM, supra note 8, at 34-35. A continuation application is an
application that discloses the same invention as a prior application. Id. It
explicitly refers to the prior application and is filed before the original
application is abandoned. Id. By fulfilling those three conditions, the
continuation application receives the benefit of the "parent" application's filing
date. In many cases, this earlier filing date is crucial, because 35 U.S.C. § 102
would bar the continuation application otherwise. Id. Continuation applications
can be filed off of other continuation applications; "children" and
"grandchildren" all receive the benefit of the first application's filing date,
provided that each application in the chain is filed properly. Id. The chain of
continuation applications is referred to as an "application family." Id. Unlike a
continuation application, an RCE is not a new application, but simply extends
the examination of an application. Id. Note that Rule 78 would limit both
normal continuation applications and continuation in part applications to two
total. Id.
15 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
16 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,838-839, 46,841.
" Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 20-22.
18 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 814-815. The court found the right through a
textual reading of 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 35 U.S.C. § 132, the statutes authorizing
continuation applications and RCEs, respectively. Id.; see also infra Part III
(B-C).
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The District Court was correct in ruling that the 5/25 rule and
the 2+1 rule are beyond the authority of the PTO to enact, and the
Federal Circuit should affirm the ruling on appeal. As recently as
August 19, 2008, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that 35 U.S.C.
§ 2(b)(2), the broadest grant of authority to the PTO, "does not
authorize the Patent Office to issue 'substantive' rules.' "19 The
5/25 rule is substantive under the Court's definition because
requiring an EDS would be a significant new obligation to the
applicant.20
Rules 78 and 114 are also a policy change from the previous
regime of unlimited continuation applications and RCEs. Whether
the rules "affect individual rights or obligations" 2' of applicants is
a more difficult question. The District Court in Tafas found a right
to unlimited continuation applications and RCEs through statutory
interpretation, but it is not clear that the court's interpretation of
the Patent Act deserves more weight than the PTO's
interpretation.22 Circumstances beyond an applicant's control may
cause an applicant to use her continuations for something other
than perfecting her claims,23 thus the 2+1 rule could act to keep an
24
applicant from fully claiming her invention. Although this may
be a rare occurrence, the inventor's right to receive patent
protection for her invention is central to the idea of patenting, 25 So
19 Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
20 See infra Part III(A).
21 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(citing Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1421, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
22 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer. . . ").
23 The phrase "perfecting claims" refers to the patent applicant working
toward her goal of crafting an allowable set of patent claims that fully protect
her invention from infringement. See DURHAM, supra note 8, at 19-21.
24 See infra Part III(B).
25 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
8.
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that even rare occurrences should be strenuously avoided.
Furthermore, the nature of certain types of invention research may
require that the related patent applications be updated over time
through continuations.26 The District Court's analysis of Rules 78
and 114 is too limited; the analysis of Rule 114 is particularly
problematic.2 7
Part II considers the background for the District Court's
decision in Tafas: First, the Federal Circuit's holding that the
Patent Office lacks substantive rulemaking authority, and the
Federal Circuit's definition of "substantive;" second, a discussion
of when the Patent Office should be required to perform notice and
comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"); third, an explanation of why the Final Rules are not
entitled to deference from the courts; and finally, proposed
improvements to the process of characterizing a rule as substantive
or procedural are set forth. Part III examines the Final Rules
through the framework discussed in Part II(D): First, Rule 75, the
5/25 rule; second, Rule 78, allowing only two continuation
applications as a matter of right; and third, Rule 114, allowing only
one RCE as a matter of right.
II. BACKGROUND AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This section discusses the underpinnings of the Tafas decision:
why the Patent Office does not have substantive rulemaking
authority; when notice and comment rulemaking is required of the
Patent Office; what, if any deference is required toward the Final
Rules, and a proposed structure for characterizing rules as
substantive or procedural.
A. The PTO does not have the authority to make substantive rules
The District Court did not make new law when it ruled that the
Patent Office does not have substantive rulemaking authority. The
Patent Act's broadest grant of authority, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)," says
that the PTO "may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law,
26 See infra Part III(B).
27 See infra Part III(B-C).
28 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (previously 35 U.S.C. § 6).
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which shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office."29 In
1991, the Federal Circuit stated that "a substantive declaration with
regard to the Commissioner's interpretation of the patent
statutes ... does not fall within the usual interpretation of such
statutory language."30 In 1996, the Federal Circuit stated the rule
even more clearly:
As we have previously held, the broadest of the PTO's rule making
powers-35 U.S.C. § 6(a)-authorizes the Commissioner to
promulgate regulations directed only to "the conduct of proceedings in
the [PTO]"; it does not grant the Commissioner the authority to issue
substantive rules. [Citing Animal Legal Defense Fund]. . . . Congress
has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rule
making power .3.. 1
This holding from Merck & Co. v. Kessler3 2 has been frequently
cited by the Federal Circuit, as recently as August 21, 2008, for the
proposition that the Patent Office lacks substantive rulemaking
authority." Thus, not only has the holding that the PTO lacks
substantive rulemaking authority been frequently and recently
affirmed, but Congress has also had well over a decade to correct
the Federal Circuit's interpretation. 34
29 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A).
30 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
3' Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
32 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
3 Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also
Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd.
of Regents, 334 F.3d 1264, 1269 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
34 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees GlaxoSmithKline at 20, n. 6, Tafas v.
Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 24, 2008). For example, the Patent
Reform Act of 2006, which never became law, contained the following
provision:
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY-In addition to the authority conferred
by other provisions of this title, the Director may promulgate such
rules, regulations, and orders as the Director determines appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title or any other law applicable to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office or that the Director
determines necessary to govern the operation and organization of the
Office.
S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 6(e) (2006).
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The Federal Circuit's definition of "substantive," most recently
cited in Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas," is that "a rule is
'substantive' when it 'effects a change in existing law or policy'
which 'affect[s] individual rights and obligations."'"6 Both Tafas
and Cooper Techs. used this definition of "substantive" when
analyzing whether the rules in question are substantive or
procedural." To define procedural rules, the Federal Circuit in
Cooper Techs. simply used the language of the Patent Act: rules
which "govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office" 38 are
procedural. 39  This definition is something of a tautology, and
therefore less helpful in determining whether a rule is substantive
or procedural.
In discussing whether the Final Rules are substantive or
procedural, the PTO's appellant's brief emphasizes how the Final
Rules relate to "proceedings in the Office," but the brief contains
very little analysis of the practical impact of the rules on
applicants.40 The PTO argues that the Final Rules cannot be
substantive because they do not alter the "substantive requirements
for patentability," such as utility, novelty, and non-obviousness.4 1
Indeed, the PTO's appellate brief explicitly rejects the definition of
"substantive" used by the courts in Tafas and Cooper Techs. as
inappropriate to the analysis of whether a rule is substantive or
procedural.4 2 However, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ("D.C. Circuit") case, American Hospital Association v.
" 536 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
36 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(citing a number of Supreme Court and circuit court cases).
n Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814-817 (E.D. Va. 2008); Cooper
Techs., 536 F.3d at 1336.
38 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006).
39 Cooper Techs., 536 F.3d at 1335 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A)).
40 Brief for the Appellants at 24-28, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed.
Cir. July 18, 2008).
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id. at 35 ("[A]sking whether a rule changes the law or alters the rights of
private parties makes no sense as a means of determining whether a rule is
procedural. Procedural rules, like substantive rules, change the law; if they did
not, there would be little point in promulgating them.").
210 [VOL. 10: 203
Tafas v. Dudas
Bowen, 43 cited in the PTO's brief does not state that an injuiry into
the "substantive impact" of a procedure is inappropriate. Rather,
it acknowledges that "even unambiguously procedural measures
affect parties to some degree," implying that rules with relatively
minor substantive impact could still be considered procedural.4 5
Other D.C. Circuit cases confirm this reading. For example, in
JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,46 the court stated: "The issue [of
whether a rule is substantive or procedural], therefore, 'is one of
degree,' and our task is to identify which substantive effects are
'sufficiently grave so that notice and comment are needed to
safeguard the policies underlying the APA." 47 Thus, according to
the D.C. Circuit, "substantive" and "procedural" are not exclusive,
binary states but rather two ends of a spectrum. The question of
how a rule "affects individual rights and obligations"48 would
seem to be helpful in determining where within that spectrum the
rule lies.
The D.C. Circuit is not the only source suggesting that the
substantive-versus-procedural divide is not as clear-cut as it may
seem in light of Merck. In In re Van Ornum, 49 the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A.")50 held that a rule that
was procedural with collateral substantive effects was within the
PTO's rulemaking authority.5' The PTO rule at issue in Van
Ornum stated that multiple patents for the same invention, which
without a terminal disclaimer would have been denied for double
43 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
4 Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
451 d. at 1047.
46 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
47 JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Lamoille
R.R. Co. v. ICC, 711 F.2d 295, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Further discussion of the
APA can be found infra § II(B).
48 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
49 686 F.2d 937 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
5o The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982. Prior to
that time, the C.C.P.A. was the appellate court responsible for patent matters.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: About the Court,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2008) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
5 In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 945 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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patenting, would become unenforceable if they were transferred
separately to different owners.5 2  The court held that this rule
amendment was valid and within the PTO's authority." Although
it is not explicit, this decision is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's
view of procedural and substantive as two ends of a spectrum. The
Van Ornum court noted, for example, that "the challenged rule has
been in effect for more than a decade and this is the first attack on
it which has come to our attention." 4 The implication is that the
lack of challenges to the rule demonstrated that the effects of the
rule were too slight for the rule to be considered substantive.
B. When notice and comment rulemaking is required for PTO
rules
One apparent difficulty with the Federal Circuit's holding that
the PTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority arises from the
interaction of the Patent Act55 and the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA").56 Three rules combine to create an apparent
contradiction. First, the Patent Act requires regulations enacted by
the PTO to be made in accordance with the notice and comment
provisions of the APA." Second, those APA provisions do not
require notice and comment for interpretive and procedural rules.
Third, the Federal Circuit has long held that the PTO may only
promulgate interpretive and procedural rules. 59 From these three
premises, it appears that the PTO is required to abide by the notice
and comment provisions of the APA, but that any rule that the
PTO has the power to enact is exempt from notice and comment
under the APA. The PTO argued in Tafas that the proper
resolution of this contradiction was to overturn the Federal Circuit
decisions which held that the PTO may only promulgate
interpretive and procedural rules, thus giving the PTO the power to
52 Id. at 945.
" Id. at 948.
54 Id. at 946.
s5 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B) (2006).
56 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006).
5 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B) (2006).
58 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006).
59 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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promulgate substantive rules.6 0  The court in Tafas forcefully
rejected this argument.6 1 Instead, to resolve the contradiction, the
court ruled that the APA's notice and comment exceptions for
procedural and interpretive rules 62 do not apply to the PTO. 6' The
Tafas court believed that the Patent Act implies that the PTO
must always engage in notice and comment rulemaking, even
when promulgating procedural or interpretive rules.65 In this, the
District Court was incorrect.
In his Administrative Law Treatise, Richard J. Pierce, Jr.
describes a "sensible approach" to characterizing rules as
substantive or procedural under the APA:
If the characterization is fairly debatable, the court considers the
purpose for which it is being asked to characterize the rule-whether
the agency can promulgate the rule without any prior notice to the
public and without receipt and consideration of comments from
affected members of the public. With this purpose and implication of
its choice of labels in mind, the court then looks at the rule to see
whether its impact on substantive rights is so great that it should be
adopted only after notice and comment.66
Like the APA's provisions for notice and comment rulemaking,67
the longstanding limitation on the Patent Office's rulemaking
power68 requires determining whether a rule is substantive.
However, these two issues have quite different purposes. The
PTO's rulemaking power is limited in order to ensure that the PTO
does not exercise powers not delegated to it by Congress. 69 The
60 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812-13 (E.D. Va. 2008).
61 Id. at 812 ("Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.") (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Assn'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
62 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006).
63 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
64 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B) (2006).
65 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
66 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.5 (4th ed.
2002).
67 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
68 Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see
supra note 33 (affirming decision).69 Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1549-50.
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purpose of notice and comment rulemaking is to "give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making," 70 thus
ensuring that the public is given notice and an opportunity to be
heard before a binding rule is enacted. There is no reason that one
test should be dispositive for both purposes. That is, the "tipping
point" on the procedural/substantive spectrum, past which a rule is
considered substantive rather than procedural, need not be the
same for notice and comment rulemaking as it is for determining
the PTO's rulemaking authority. Professor Robert A. Anthony
states that notice and comment rulemaking is required whenever a
rule would have "practical binding effect upon private parties." '
This standard is stricter than the "affecting individuals' existing
rights and obligations" 72 standard used by the Federal Circuit in
determining the PTO's rulemaking power. Thus, it should be
possible for rules with some substantive content to be within the
PTO's rulemaking authority, yet still be subject to notice and
comment rulemaking. Separating the tests for rulemaking
authority and the notice and comment requirement would alleviate
the need to reconcile the Patent Act with the APA. Furthermore, it
avoids the harsh policy of the District Court's solution, which
would burden the Patent Office with the requirement of performing
notice and comment rulemaking even for purely procedural rules.
70 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
7' Robert A. Anthony, A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN. L.
REv. 1045, 1047 (2000).
72 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979)).
73 The rule in Van Ornum is one such rule. By placing a restriction upon
transfer of patent rights in a special case, it was binding upon private parties, and
thus subject to notice and comment rulemaking. A notice and comment hearing
was held, but the rule was still found to be within the PTO's authority to
promulgate. See In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
74 See Brief for the Appellants at 40, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed.
Cir. July 18, 2008).





Notice and comment required
Outside PTO's rulemaking authority
Rule triggers Rule "affects
5 U.S.C. 553 individual rights
and obligations" Note: drawing is not to scale
C. The Final Rules are not entitled to Chevron deference
Because Congress generally delegates a substantial amount of
authority to federal agencies, the rules and statutory interpretations
made by those agencies tend to be given a high degree of
deference." One common level of deference, and the level which
the PTO argues it should receive in Tafas, is Chevron deference."
Under Chevron deference, the reviewing court's first step is to
determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." If Congress has not, the second question for
the reviewing court is whether the rule is "based on a permissible
construction of the statute."" The PTO argues that it is entitled to
Chevron deference regarding the Final Rules and in its
interpretation of its own authority under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2).79
7 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
76 Brief for the Appellants, supra note 10, at 18-23.
n Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842.
Id. at 843.
7 Brief for the Appellants, supra note 10, at 18-23.
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The PTO's appellant's brief argues that the PTO should be
afforded Chevron deference whenever the Office is exercising its
rulemaking authority, based on the fact that the Federal Circuit has
afforded PTO interpretations Chevron deference on many previous
occasions.so However, two recent Federal Circuit cases make clear
that, even if the PTO's rulemaking is often entitled to deference, it
is not always entitled to deference. In Brand v. Miller,8 the
Federal Circuit said, "[i]n most situations deference is due to
agency positions on a legal question. But this is not a Chevron
situation . . . because we have held in any event that the Board
does not earn Chevron deference on questions of substantive patent
law."82 The next year, in Cooper Techs.," the court considered
three questions before deciding that Chevron deference applied.
First, the Federal Circuit determined whether the rule was within
the PTO's rulemaking authority-that is, whether the rule in
question was substantive, procedural, or interpretive. 84 The court
found that the rule was interpretive, and thus within the general
scope of the PTO's authority. Second, the court considered
whether the rule was promulgated lawfully, in accordance with the
APA.86 Concluding that it was, the court's third action was to
verify that the statute interpreted by the rule in question was a
statute that the PTO was responsible for administering." Only
after performing these three steps to ensure that the PTO had acted
lawfully and within its authority in promulgating the rule did the
80 Brief for the Appellants, supra note 10, at 23.
8 487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
82 Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 650 (2007).
83 Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
84 Id. at 1335-36.
8 1Id. at 1336.
8 Id. at 1336-37. The PTO had engaged in notice and comment rulemaking
when promulgating the rule. Id. The court ruled that because the rule in
question was interpretive, notice and comment rulemaking would not have been
required. Id. Regardless, the rule was promulgated lawfully. Id. Presumably,
if the court had found that notice and comment rulemaking should have been
performed when it was not, the court would have struck down the rule. Id.
" Id. at 1337.
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Federal Circuit begin the two-step Chevron analysis. Thus, the
district court in Tafas was correct in saying that the conclusion that
the Final Rules were substantive "renders it unnecessary to decide
whether the PTO's interpretation of the Patent Act should be given
Chevron deference."8 9
The PTO's second argument for deference is that the PTO's
interpretation of its own authority is itself a question of statutory
interpretation which deserves Chevron deference."o The PTO's
appellant's brief quotes a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia
saying: "it is settled law that the rule of deference applies even to
an agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority or
jurisdiction." If this rule applies, then the procedural versus
substantive analysis performed by the district court in Tafas should
have been replaced with the much more deferential question of
whether the PTO's interpretation that the Final Rules were within
its rulemaking power was a permissible interpretation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 2(b)(2). Unfortunately for the PTO, Justice Scalia in his
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi92 concurrence then
goes on to say: "[tlo be sure, in defining agency jurisdiction
Congress sometimes speaks in plain terms, in which case the
agency has no discretion."93 Ever since Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Quigg,94 it is clear that the Federal Circuit believes
Congress spoke plainly in granting the PTO authority to "govern
the conduct of proceedings in the Office" 95 and that the "usual
88 But see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4 (4th
ed. 2002) (The Federal Circuit may have been incorrect to give Chevron
deference to an interpretive rule).
89 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2008); see also
Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the
"rule of controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply" when the rule
was outside the PTO's authority to promulgate).
90 Brief for the Appellants, supra note 10, at 21.
9' Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354,
381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Brief of Amicus Curiae William
Mitchell College of Law Intellectual Property Institute in Support of Appellees
at 15, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008).
92 487 U.S. 354 (1998).
93 I. at 382.
94 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
9 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006).
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interpretation of such statutory language" would not include
substantive rulemaking power." In the PTO's appellant's brief,
although the PTO argued that the Final Rules were procedural, it
did not argue that the "conduct of proceedings in the Office" 97
language in the general statutory grant of authority should include
substantive rules." Finally, Congress has had many opportunities
over the years to explicitly grant substantive rulemaking power to
the Patent Office, and it has consistently declined to do so.99
Instead, Congress has reserved for itself many of the powers it
might have delegated to the PTO, such as the power to set many of
the fees involved in patent prosecution.'o Thus, because Congress
plainly did not grant substantive rulemaking authority to the PTO,
the PTO has no special discretion in regard to its own authority.
Accordingly, its interpretation of the extent of that authority,
including the question of whether the Final Rules are within its
authority, should not receive deference.
D. A proposed clarification of rule characterization
The District Court's first step in analyzing whether the Final
Rules are substantive or procedural should have been to define the
problem: either analyze the set of rules as a single package or
break the rules up and analyze subsets separately. For some rules
the choice is easy because the rules intertwine. Rules 75 and 265
are an example. Rule 75 requires submission of an ESD for
applications containing more than 5 independent claims or 25 total
96 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For
example, compare Congress's grant of authority to the PTO, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)
("may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which-(A) shall govern
the conduct of proceedings in the Office"), with the grant of authority to the
Federal Communications Commission, 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) ("The Commission
may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such
orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution
of its functions.").
9 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006).
98 Brief for the Appellants, supra note 10. at 2008-1352. In fact, Appellants
conceded that "the Office has the statutory authority to issue 'procedural' rules
but lacks authority to issue 'substantive' ones." Id. at 11-12.
99 See supra, note 34.
' Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
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claims.'0 1 Rule 265 sets out the requirements for a proper ESD
submission.102 Rule 75 without Rule 265 is meaningless, and Rule
265 without Rule 75 is pointless. Only together do the rules make
sense, so they should be treated as one rule when determining
whether they are substantive or procedural. When two rules have
nothing to do with one another, they should be analyzed separately.
Then if one rule is found to be unacceptable, the wheat is not
thrown out with the chaff. When rules interact weakly, the court
faces a more difficult choice. On one hand, an agency should not
be allowed to do by halves what it cannot do as a whole. That is,
an agency should not be allowed to promulgate two procedural
rules which in aggregate are substantive. On the other hand,
rejecting rules unnecessarily creates more work for both the court
and the agency, as the agency must then ask the court to consider
the innocent rule standing alone. Analyzing a set of rules in their
aggregate does not mean that rules would only be considered
together. It simply means that the effect of the interaction of the
rules is considered in addition to the effect of the individual rules.
The District Court did not define the problem clearly. This is a
moot point, however, as it found each rule, standing alone, to be
substantive. 103 Even so, the court should have considered the Final
Rules in the aggregate, rather than individually.104  This is
especially true because the District Court's injunction was issued
against the rules in their entirety. Thus, the injunction acts against
Rule 105,05 which is arguably independent of the other Final
Rules, even though the District Court did not examine Rule 105 in
its decision.106 Once the court has decided which rules shall be
01 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,836-837 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
102 Id. at 46,842-43.
103 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
'0Infra Part III(C).
1os Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,841 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1). This change to 37 C.F.R. pt. 1.105 would allow the patent
examiner to require a submission from the patent applicant which explained
where in the patent's specifications there was written description support for the
patent claims.
106 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805.
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considered together and which separately, it may proceed to
characterize each set of rules as substantive or procedural.
Under the Federal Circuit's definition, "a rule is 'substantive'
when it 'effects a change in existing law or policy' which 'affect[s]
individual rights and obligations."' 07 When considering the effect
of the rule upon the individual, care must be taken to consider each
of the individual's options under the rule, and the impact of each
option. "[E]ven a rule establishing a time limit for filing briefs can
have a devastating effect on the substantive rights of a party who
does not file by the time limit."'" However, the impact of filing
within the time limit may be much less substantial-the attorney
responsible for the brief may simply have to devote more of her
time to it. Although the impact of missing the filing date may be
devastating, careful parties will file by the deadline and experience
only a small impact. Thus, even if the impact of one option under
the rule would be significant, the rule might still be procedural if
the overall impact of the rule is less significant. Furthermore, the
impact of the rule must be upon the party's rights and
obligations-an impact on the party's schedule or pocketbook will
not qualify.109
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL RULES
This section analyzes the Final Rules using the method
presented in Part II(D). First, Rule 75, the 5/25 rule; second, Rule
78, which would allow only two continuation applications as a
matter of right; and third, Rule 114, which would allow only one
RCE as a matter of right.
107 Animal Legal Def Fund, supra note 21 (citing a number of Supreme Court
and circuit court cases).1 0 8 ICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.5 (4th ed.
2002).
09 See id. Pierce summarizes two cases which support this assertion. In both
cases, the D.C. Circuit found that rules were procedural even though the rules
could have imposed new burdens upon individuals, because the burdens did not
"alter the rights or interests of parties." JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320,




A. Final Rule 75 is substantive and beyond the PTO's authority to
enact
Final Rule 75 (the "5/25 rule") would require any application
with more than five independent claims or more than twenty-five
total claims to include extra documentation (called an examination
support document or ESD) with claim explanation and prior art
search information.'o There are three options available to the
patent applicant under the 5/25 rule: (1) non-compliance with the
rule, (2) submission of a compliant ESD when necessary, and
(3) avoidance of the rule by reducing the number of claims below
the 5/25 limit. The consequences for a missing or insufficient ESD
are severe."' According to Final Rule 265, if the prior art search
or ESD is insufficient, the applicant would be given a non-
xtendable two month period in which to correct it."2 If, within this
time, the applicant either has not filed a sufficient ESD or has
reduced her number of claims below the 5/25 limit, the application
would be deemed forfeit by the PTO." 3 This consequence is so
severe that applicants will take great care to avoid it; thus non-
compliance is not a reasonable option for applicants.
The court in Tafas described compliance with the 5/25 rule as
"shifting the examination burden away from the PTO and onto
applicants."" 4 ESD compliance entails performing a search of
U.S. patents and patent application publications, foreign patent
documents, and non-patent literature."' The ESD must contain a
description of the search, a listing of the most pertinent references
found, an identification of all of the limitations of each of the
claims in each reference, "a detailed explanation of how each of
the application's independent claims is patentable over the cited
references,"ll 6 and a showing of the 35 USC § 112 support for
110 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,836, 46,842, 46,843 (Aug. 21, 2007)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
' Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,843.
112 id
113 id
114 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 816 (E.D. Va. 2008).
"s Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,842.
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each limitation of each of the claims.' Requiring an ESD even in
some circumstances is a change in policy, because currently the
elements of an ESD are not required for any application."' The
Patent Office cites the "inordinate amount of patent examining
resources" consumed by patents with large numbers of claims as
its reason for promulgating the 5/25 rule."' Thus, the Patent
Office hopes that the rule will reduce the average examination time
for applications.120 Because this reduction would be accomplished
either by applicants presenting fewer claims or through the
additional information provided to examiners in the ESD,121 the
5/25 rule will have a significant impact on patent applicants in
general.
The submission of an ESD could be a significant obligation for
the applicant. One recent patent which illustrates this is Patent No.
7,393,254, for a Marine Buoy. 12 2  This invention is for a new
design of marine buoys. The design permits large marine buoys,
traditionally constructed out of heavy materials in order to
withstand the extreme stresses of their deep-water environments, to
be constructed out of lighter, cheaper materials without sacrificing
durability. 123  The patent contains fifty-nine claims: nine
independent claims and fifty dependent claims.124 Like the claims
in most patents, these claims describe the invention in different
ways and with various degrees of specificity, so that even if some
claims are invalidated, the invention can still be protected by the
remaining claims. 125 If an ESD had been required for this
117 Id.
"' Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
1'9 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,721. Note that 35 U.S.C. § 41 requires
patent applicants to pay an additional fee for each additional claim past a certain
number, so the PTO is already receiving at least some compensation for the
additional resources expended on applications with many claims. 35 U.S.C.
§ 41 (2006).
120 Id. at 46,717; see also Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
121 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,842.
122 Marine Buoy, U.S. Patent No. 7,393,254 (filed Feb. 19, 2007) (issued July
1,2008).
123 Id. col. 2, 1. 29-34.
124 Id. col. 13-18.
125 See DuRHAM, supra note 8, at 19-2 1.
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application, the prior art search alone would have been time-
consuming.126 Once the search had been performed and described,
and the most pertinent references listed, the ESD would have to
describe in detail how each of the nine independent claims was
patentable over each of the cited references.127  Finally, for each
limitation of each of the fifty-nine claims in the patent, the ESD
would include a showing that the limitation was supported by the
patent specification.128  Creation of such an ESD would be a
technical and time-consuming exercise, far more involved than
simply submitting an extra document, and therefore a significant
burden to the applicant.129 The District Court in Tafas determined
that the requirements of an ESD burdened not just the applicant's
schedule and pocketbook, but the applicant's rights and obligations
as well. 3 0 In particular, the District Court quoted a 2005 Federal
Circuit case: "[T]his court has repeatedly reaffirmed the
proposition that 'as a general rule, there is no duty to conduct a
prior art search. . . .'
The applicant's third option, reducing his claims below the
5/25 limit, is likewise unattractive. It is probably possible for
some applicants to trim the fat from their applications and avoid
126 Prior art searching typically involves searching databases of domestic and
foreign patents, patent applications, and scientific literature. Because marine
buoys are used globally, the prior art search should also be global. And, because
marine buoys have been used for centuries and the invention could be built
without modem materials, the prior art search should not be limited to recent
inventions. Thus, the body of domestic and foreign patent and scientific
literature to search would be huge. Although computers do help expedite such
searches, only a skilled person would be able to determine how relevant the
prior art of each previously invented marine buoy would be.
127 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,842.128 d
12 9 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 13. Also note that among the PTO
fees set by Congress are additional fees for each independent claim in excess of
three, and each dependent claim in excess of 20. Patent Act, § 35 U.S.C.
41(a)(1)(B). Thus, to the extent that the ESD requirement can be considered an
additional fee required of applicants with a large number of claims, the PTO
may be encroaching on authority Congress has reserved for itself.
130 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
131 Id. (citing Frazier v. Roessel Cine Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230, 1238
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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the 5/25 rule without degrading their eventual patent. However,
for complex inventions, it may not be possible to craft a set of
claims which both fully protects the invention and stays under the
5/25 limit.132  Thus, for at least some inventors, reducing the
number of claims to the 5/25 level would result in some loss of
their rights to patent their inventions. 3
It is clear that each of the three options under the 5/25 rule
would result in a substantive effect upon patent applicants.
Compliance with the ESD requirement would represent a
significant new burden upon the applicant. Avoidance of the ESD
requirement would result in incomplete patent protection for some
inventions because non-compliance would result in patent
abandonment. The ESD thus "affect[s] individual rights and
obligations" under the Federal Circuit's standard,134 and the 5/25
rule is therefore substantive.
The PTO's final argument is that even if the ESD requirement
would have substantive effects, the procedural aspects of the 5/25
rule are so strong that the rule should be considered nominally
procedural. That is, the PTO contends that at most, the 5/25 rule
should be considered procedural with substantive collateral effects,
and thus within the PTO's authority under In Re Van Ornum.'"
However, Van Ornum is easily distinguishable because the rule in
Van Ornum restricted an extremely minor and obscure "right" 36
and created no new obligation, compared to the significant new
ESD obligation created by the 5/25 rule.' The 5/25 rule falls
much closer to the substantive end of the spectrum than the Van
Ornum rule, and the 5/25 rule should therefore be considered
outside the Patent Office's authority.
132 See Brief of Monsanto Company as Amicus Curiae at 7-14, Tafas v.
Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008).
13 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
134 Supra note 105 (alteration in original).
13 Brief for the Appellants at 30-32, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed.
Cir. July 18, 2008).
136 The right at issue in Van Ornum was the right to transfer overlapping
patents, which would have been invalid on double patenting grounds but for a
terminal disclaimer, to two separate people. In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937,
945 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
1 See supra Part III(A).
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B. Final Rule 78 is beyond the PTO's authority to enact
As with the 5/25 rule, rules 78 and 114 (collectively the 2+1
rule) represent a notable change in PTO policy. Chains of
continuation applications have been in use for over fifty years.'
The practice of allowing multiple RCEs has existed for nearly a
decade.'3 9 The 2+1 rule would change these existing policies by
requiring the applicant to submit a petition showing that material
presented in the continuation or RCE could not have been
submitted previously for any continuation after the second, or any
RCE after the first.'40 Thus, the current use of continuations and
RCEs to continue prosecution after a rejection would generally not
be permitted past the 2+1 limit.14 '
While the 2+1 rule clearly changes continuation policy, its
impact on the rights and obligations of an applicant is less clear.
The PTO argues that efficient prosecution will allow applicants to
perfect their claims within the 2+1 limit, and that the ability to
request further continuations or RCEs upon petition and showing
will protect the patent rights of applicants in cases of unforeseen
circumstances.' 42  The PTO's concern for the rights of the
applicant in these cases is not entirely convincing: "[E]ven if such
a showing [that the material could not have been submitted
previously] is not made, an applicant is not barred from filing a
third or subsequent continuation application; the only consequence
is that the new filing does not receive the benefit of the initial
application's filing date."' 43 The loss of the filing date benefit,
which the PTO dismisses so glibly, would often entirely prevent
the invention from being patented, resulting in the loss of the
138 See generally In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253 (1968).
139 Request for Continued Examination Practice and Changes to Provisional
Application Practice, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,092, 50,095-96 (Aug. 16, 2000) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) ("an applicant . . . is not limited in the number of
times [an RCE may be submitted]").
140 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,838-39, 46,841 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
141 Id. at 46769-77; see also Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 814 ("[The 2+1 rule]
effectively imposes a hard limit on additional applications.").
142 Brief for the Appellants at 7-9, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir.
July 18, 2008).
143 Id. at 7.
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inventor's rights in his invention. 144 Given the difficulty of
satisfying the "new material" petition and showing requirement
along with the significant consequence of failing the petition and
showing requirement, the court in Tafas quite reasonably
characterized the 2+1 rule as a "hard limit" on continuations.145
GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK") in its plaintiff-appellee's brief, and
Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") in its amicus brief both
convincingly argue that for certain types of inventions, Rule 78
would prevent inventors from fully protecting their invention. 146
Monsanto contends that multiple continuation applications are
necessary in order to fully protect "complicated inventions that
develop over time."1 4 7 For these types of inventions, the initial
patent application contains broad claims, and continuation
applications contain more specific claims. 148 Monsanto cites as an
example its own catalyst technology;149 GSK describes a similar
situation involving new classes of drug compounds.' 5 0  In these
examples, Monsanto and GSK use continuations to claim
particularly successful specific embodiments of their general
inventions.' 5 ' Thus, they argue that Rule 78's two continuation
144 The Patent Act bars an inventor from receiving a patent under certain
conditions. For example, an inventor must apply for a patent within a year of
describing the invention in a print publication to be eligible for a patent on the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). Similarly, if the inventor offers the
invention for sale in the United States, any application filed more than one year
after the offer of sale would be ineligible for the grant of a patent. Id.
Continuation applications which receive the benefit of the earlier application's
filing date do not run afoul of these bars, where an application which did not
benefit from the earlier filing date would be barred. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006).
145 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (E.D. Va. 2008).
146 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees GlaxoSmithKline at 6-9, Tafas v. Dudas, No.
2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2008); Brief of Monsanto Company as Amicus
Curiae at 3-5, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008).
147 Brief of Monsanto Company as Amicus Curiae at 7, Tafas, No. 2008-1352
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008).
148 Id. at 8-11.
149 Id. at 7-25.
1so Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees GlaxoSmithKline at 8, Tafas, No. 2008-1352
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2008).
is' Brief of Monsanto Company as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Tafas v. Dudas,
No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees
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limit would reduce their ability to protect developments made after
two continuations had already been filed.15 2  While Rule 78
standing alone would have some substantive effect upon
applicants, the substantive effect of Rule 78 would be even greater
if the 5/25 rule were enacted as well. 153 Both the rules would
interact to cause an effect greater than the sum of their parts. Rule
78 limits the applicant's ability to perfect his claims through
continued prosecution; it thus encourages the applicant to act with
foresight and file all claims in the initial application. 154 This
foresight might be difficult to exercise in practice, especially if the
invention is continuing to develop. Denied the opportunity to
repeatedly amend their claims until they hit the "bullseye" of ideal
protection, applicants could instead choose a "shotgun" approach.
That is, they could file a large number of claims initially, hoping
that some claims would hit the bullseye even without additional
time to aim or perfect them. The 5/25 rule would require an ESD
from applicants wishing to file a large number of claims, 155 thus
placing a burden upon applicants who might otherwise use this
alternate method to fully claim their inventions. Describing this
difficulty, Monsanto says, "[o]ne rule demands uncommon
prescience, the other thwarts it."1 56 Thus, Rule 78 standing alone
would have a substantive effect on applicants standing alone, and
an even greater effect when combined with the 5/25 rule.
GlaxoSmithKline at 8, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24,
2008).
152 Brief of Monsanto Company as Amicus Curiae at 17-18, Tafas, No. 2008-
1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees GlaxoSmithKline at
8-9, Tafas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2008).
15 See, e.g. Brief of Monsanto Company as Amicus Curiae at 11-16, Tafas,
No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008).
154 Id. at 16.
1s5 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,836 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
156 Brief of Monsanto Company as Amicus Curiae at 16, Tafas, No. 2008-
1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008).
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Although the District Court held that Rule 78 was substantive,
it considered the practical effect of Rule 78 only in passing. 57
Instead, the court held that Rule 78 conflicted with the Patent
Act,1 8 which states that continuation applications "shall have"
priority benefit from the initial application.'59  Furthermore, the
Patent Act specifically allows for chains of multiple
continuations. 160 The Ta as court, relying on the Patent Act and
two C.C.P.A. decisions,' 1 held that the statutory language meant
that any continuation application, not just the first two, was entitled
to priority from the initial application.'62
In support of its contention that it has the authority to place a
limit upon continuations, the PTO cites the case of In re Bogese.'6 1
The Bogese case involves a patent applicant who filed ten identical
157 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 815 (E.D. Va. 2008) ("[Final Rule
78] may also impact applicants' rights under Sections 102 and 103 and result in
the denial of otherwise meritorious patents.").
158 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006). Stating:
An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner
provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an
application previously filed in the United States, or as provided by
section 363 of this title, which is filed by an inventor or inventors
named in the previously filed application shall have the same effect, as
to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application, if
filed before the patenting or abandonment of or termination of
proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly
entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the first application and if it




5 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 814-15.
160 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006) ("[Continuations can be filed] on the
first application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing
date of the first application.").
161 In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253, 254 (C.C.P.A 1968); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d
595, 604 n.13 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("a limit upon continuing applications is a matter
of policy for the Congress").
162 Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
163 Brief for the Appellants at 7-9, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir.
July 18, 2008) (citing In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see
also Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (holding that the doctrine of prosecution laches is a permissible method
by which the PTO can combat undue delay in prosecution).
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continuation applications in succession, transparently intending to
simply extend the prosecution of his patent rather than help the
application progress toward acceptance.'" When the examiner
rejected the tenth continuation, he warned Bogese that "the next
continuation of this series may be rejected by invoking the
equitable doctrine of laches, absent any substantive amendment to
advance prosecution."' 6 5 Despite the warning, Bogese filed an
eleventh identical continuation application.' 6 His application was
then deemed forfeit by the PTO, and he entirely lost his rights to a
patent on his invention.167 The Federal Circuit upheld the use of
the doctrine of laches to prevent undue delay, stating that "the PTO
may impose reasonable deadlines and requirements on parties that
appear before it."' The PTO argues that Bogese should be
considered an explicit grant of authority for Rule 78.' However,
it is not clear that the Federal Circuit intended to grant the PTO the
authority to create "one size fits all" deadlines like Rule 78.170
In summary, both GSK's appellee's brief and Monsanto's
amicus brief convincingly present the case that, at least for certain
types of inventions, Rule 78 will reduce the inventor's ability to
obtain full patent protection for his invention.171 This effect on
"individual rights and obligations"l72 meets the Federal Circuit's
definition for a substantive rule. Additionally, the Tafas court's
statutory analysis provides strong support for rejecting Rule 78 as
64 In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
165 Id. (The doctrine of laches means that failure to assert one's rights can
result in a loss of those rights.)
166 Id. at 1365.
167 Idr.
168 Id. at 1368.
169 Brief for the Appellants, supra note 10, at 43-46 (citing In re Bogese, 303
F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
170 See generally Bogese, 303 F.3d at 1362.
171 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees GlaxoSmithKline, at 6-9, Tafas v. Dudas,
No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 24, 2008); Brief of Monsanto Company as
Amicus Curiae at 7-25, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3,
2008); see also supra Part III(B).
172 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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inconsistent with the Patent Act.13 For these reasons, the Federal
Circuit should uphold the injunction against Rule 78.
C. Final Rule 114 is not substantive when considered
independently of the other Final Rules
The Tafas ruling on Rule 114, finding a statutory right to
unlimited RCEs, is more problematic than the Rule 78 ruling.
Unlike 35 U.S.C. § 120, which specifically allows for multiple
continuations,174 35 U.S.C. § 132 is silent on the issue of whether
multiple RCEs would be allowed. It simply states that "[if] the
applicant persists in his claim for a patent, with or without
amendment, the application shall be reexamined.""' Nor was the
Tafas court able to cite cases supporting the practice of unlimited
RCEs, perhaps because RCEs are a relatively recent innovation.176
Although the Tafas court held that the language of § 132 was "best
read as evidence that Congress intended to allow for an unlimited
number of RCEs,"17 7 it also adopted an alternate position. This
alternate position was that the word "application" in § 132 meant
that every initial or continuation application was entitled to at least
one RCE as a matter of right, rather than the one RCE per
application family allowed under Rule 114. "' However, the recent
Cooper Techs. court held that the phrase "original application" in
the statute on inter partes examinations could permissibly mean
either the initial application of an application family or any initial
or continuation application.'79 Thus the Tafas court's
interpretation of "application" is probably only one of multiple
permissible interpretations. Because courts tend to show deference
to agency interpretations of statutes that the agency is charged with
1' Supra notes 155-160, and accompanying text.
174 Supra notes 158, 160, and accompanying text.
17 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006).
176 Request for Continued Examination Practice and Changes to Provisional
Application Practice, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,092 (Aug. 16, 2000) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1).
" Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 815 (E.D.Va. 2008).
'
78 id.
179 Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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administering, the Federal Circuit may be persuaded by the PTO's
interpretation of § 132. 180
While the statutory analysis of Rule 114 performed in Tafas
may not persuade the Federal Circuit, the question of whether Rule
114 is substantive is much simpler. Standing alone, Rule 114 is
not substantive, and would be within the PTO's power to enact.'
This is because the entire effect of an RCE could alternatively be
achieved through the use of continuation applications. When
enacting the rules for RCE practice, the Patent Office described
RCEs as a simpler alternative method for an applicant to pay for
further examination of his application: "Previously, an applicant
had to file a continuing application . . . to obtain continued
examination of an application for a fee."1 82 Thus, the only effect
of a limit on RCEs, without a corresponding limit on continuation
applications, would be to force applicants to use continuations
rather than RCEs past the limit. The D.C. Circuit has stated that
this type of rule is procedural: "the 'critical feature' of a rule that
satisfies the so-called 'procedural exception' is that it covers
agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of
parties, although it may alter the manner in which the parties
present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency."' 83
However, Rule 114 was not promulgated alone, but as part of
the Final Rules. 184 Rule 114's interaction with Rule 78 is clear
enough that the District Court often discussed the rules together as
the "2+1 rule."' 8 5  Though the District Court analyzed the rules
individually and found them substantive because the PTO
1so See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
'8' See supra Part II(A).
182 Request for Continued Examination Practice and Changes to Provisional
Application Practice, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,092, 50,092 (Aug. 16, 2000) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
183 James V. Hurson Assoc., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (internal citations omitted).
184 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1).
185 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805,passim (E.D. Va. 2008).
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promulgated the Final Rules as a package,186 it would have been
appropriate to rule on them as a package, then remand to the PTO
if the agency wished to pursue rules individually. For this reason,
the District Court was correct in issuing an injunction against the
Final Rules in their entirety despite the faulty ruling on Rule 114.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court in Tafas v. Dudas was correct in its ruling
that the Final Rules promulgated by the PTO to promote efficiency
and reduce the backlog at the Patent Office are substantive and
thus outside the Patent Office's rulemaking authority. The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should affirm the decision on
appeal. However, the Federal Circuit has the opportunity to do
more. It should clarify the circumstances under which the Patent
Office is required to engage in notice and comment rulemaking. It
can more clearly define the scope of the Patent Office's authority,
the deference due to Patent Office rules and interpretations, and the
proper method of analyzing Patent Office rulemaking. In
formulating this clarification, the Federal Circuit can draw upon
the D.C. Circuit's experience in administrative law and provide a
more nuanced view of substantive and procedural rules.'
186 Final Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1). Not only are the Final Rules unified by their goal of creating a
"better focused and effective examination process to reduce the large and
growing backlog of unexamined applications" but the PTO understands that the
rules would affect one another. Id. at p.46717. For example, discussing the use
of continuation applications to file additional claims without triggering the 5/25
rule's ESD requirement, the PTO said: "Thus, an applicant may present up to
fifteen independent claims and seventy-five total claims to a single patentably
distinct invention via an initial application and two continuation or continuation-
in-part applications that are filed and prosecuted serially without providing
either an examination support document or a justification." Id. at p. 46,721.
W See generally Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA?
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 270
(2006) (arguing that the Patent Office and the Federal Circuit would benefit by
adopting principles of administrative law from the D.C. Circuit).
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